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Abstract
The concept of reflexivity has become an often-intoned mantra in contemporary social
science, particulary, perhaps, sociology. This article, however, argues that the blanket use
of reflexivity glosses over and confuses many different actual definitions and
understandings of the concept - not least because the concept operates differently as a
move within each of the divergent analytic games that compose the overall discipline. One
(among many other) crucial distinctions is that between stipulative and essential
reflexivity - the former originating in part in G.H.Meads notions of the I and the Me, and
extended within current theories of reflexive modernity. This concept has been wrenched
by professional social scientist from its mundane moorings and has been elevated into an
analytic technique of self interrogation. By contrast, essential reflexivity, as adduced by
ethnomethodological sociologists, remains resolutely emplaced in the domain of lay
society-members ordinary sense-making practices: it here refers to the reciprocal,
back-and-forth determinations of sense of members mundane descriptions of their specific
circumstances and of the circumstances they describe - description and circumstance
reflect upon each other during the sense-making practices. A brief example of essential
reflexivity is given- reflexive formulations in ordinary conversations.
Keywords: reflexivity, description, ethnomethodology
Resumo
O conceito de reflexividade tornou-se um mantra entoado muito freqüentemente na
ciŒncia social contemporânea, particularmente, talvez, na sociologia. Este artigo,
entretanto, argumenta que o uso generalizado da noçªo de reflexividade mistura e
confunde muitas definiçıes e compreensıes diferentes deste conceito - alØm do que o
conceito opera de modo diferente como um movimento dentro de cada um dos jogos
analíticos divergentes que compıem a disciplina como um todo. Uma (entre vÆrias outras)
distinçıes cruciais Ø entre reflexividade estipulativa e essencial - a primeira originada em
parte das noçıes de G. H. Mead de Eu e de Mim e estendida dentro das teorias correntes
da modernidade reflexiva. Este conceito foi arrancado de suas amarras mundanas por
cientistas sociais profissionais e foi elevado a uma tØcnica analítica de auto-interrogaçªo.
Em contraste, a reflexividade essencial, conforme tratada pelos sociólogos etnometodólogos,
permanece resolutamente colocada no domínio das prÆticas cotidianas de produçªo de
sentido dos membros comuns da sociedade: aqui, ela se refere às determinaçıes recíprocas
do sentido das descriçıes mundanas dos membros, de suas circunstâncias específicas e das
circunstâncias que descrevem - descriçªo e circunstância refletem uma à outra no processo
de produçªo de sentido. É dado um breve exemplo de reflexividade essencial - formulaçıes
reflexivas em conversaçıes ordinÆrias.
Palavras-Chave: reflexividade, descriçªo, etnometodologia.
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I. In this paper, I wish to distinguish between two opposed
analytic definitions of reflexivity, namely stipulative and
essential reflexivity3. At the same time, I wish to trace
the consequences of each definition for the study of so-
ciological description. By sociological description, I in-
tend lay or practical descriptions rather than those of
professional sociologists. However, since the latter are,
necessarily and in various ways, predicated upon the former,
I shall also be making some observations on how sociolo-
gists describe the world-as-seen-from-within-sociology.
I shall also be treating sociological description as social ac-
tivity, as an array of practices. This will be done with a view to of-
fering an abbreviated empirical example of the reflexivities of lay
descriptive practice, that of formulations in ordinary conversation
and also in school classroom interaction
Reflexivity has come to be employed in sociology as a port-
manteau term, one that conflates and confuses several distin-
guishable analytic senses: indeed, it seems to have become the El
Niæo of contemporary sociology, employed as the universal ac-
count for everything. The different senses of reflexivity, how-
ever, in fact belong to different and incompatible sociological lan-
guage games and, consequently, are put to very different, and of-
ten mutually-exclusive analytic uses.
II. We might define stipulative reflexivity as a the-
ory-formed and theory-driven concept, one that refers to
the implication of the socviological or anthropological
observer in the field s/he is observing. Observer and the
observational field are treated as reciprocally (often
dialogically)-defining. For instance, the observer is seen
as constituting the field in terms of his/her cultur-
ally-based and/or disciplinary-based pressupositions.
This has led to a position - found mainly though not ex-
clusively in interpretive and critical anthropologies - that
when the analytic observer is saying something about
his/her object, s/he is also saying or manifesting some-
thing about him/herself. This self-referenciality is held as
having its roots in the reflexivities of everyday life, as,
for instance, characterized by the philosopher George
Herbert Mead in his notion of taking the role of the
other or the inner conversation of the I and the
Me. In other words, Mead offers us a conception of
the reflexive alternation of the self as subject and the
self as object4.
As so frequently happens in social science, a method of ordi-
nary reasoning quickly ceases to be examined as such. Instead, it
comes to be both arrogated and reified by the professional ana-
lyst, becoming elevated to the status of a methodological prescrip-
tion. Indeed, in this reading of stipulative reflexivity, the
concept ceases to have primary import in its ordinary de-
terminations and acquires such import in its profes-
sional-methodological ones. Thus we find that the pro-
fessional observer is enjoined to switch into reflexive
mode, involving perhaps a confessional self-examination
of the observers relation to the observed, of his/her de-
scriptive devices (including, for instance, linguistic trans-
actions and fieldnote writing), the claim to authoritative
writing the pervasive use of ethnocentric, historic or dis-
ciplinary bias or some other form of perspectivalism, eg.
Gender-based or age-based.
In this way, there is (allegedly) a constant
self-monitoring of the analytic perceivers implication
inthe perceptual field: this form of reflexivity is, then
akin to what the existential psichoanalyst David Cooper
termed dialectical rationality. This riding shotgun on
oneself implies, clearly, a claim concerning the
realignementof the observer with the observed, if not a
professed reformulation of the entire relation between
the two. It is a way of dispriveleging the accounts of
other analysts as well as ones own. Paradoxical as it may
seem, the element of reciprocity or mutual implication of
observer and observed can also lead to the selective
dispriveleging of ones subjects descriptions of their
world relative to those of others. This may be effected on
an ad hominem basis, eg. an authority-holders account
may be undercut whilst an underlings account may be
accorded authority: hence the stipulative aspect of this
form of reflexivity. Other undercutting techniques may
also be used, eg the deconstruction of the organising
logic of the account or the attribution of vested interests.
Thus, one may end up with a reciprocal discounting of
descriptive accounts, a denial of authoritative speaking
to various parties, the observed as well as the observer.
This, then, is the version of reflexivity that is
(largely tacitly) presupposed in contemporary studies of
reflexive modernity - the self-aware, self-interrogating
society: here, reflexivity is taken out of its natural home
of ordinary social action and interaction and reified, in
hyperbolic form, into the basis of an entire moment of
modernity.
The arrogation by the analyst of this ordinary re-
flexivity to an analytic mentality has, oddly, served to re-
instate something akin to the introspectionism that all
the classic sociologists eschewed - where criticism be-
comes self-awareness and self-interrrogation of the ana-
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lysts own purported own biases, moral commitments, etc.,
and of her/his self-conscious self-placement vis-a-vis the field
of observation in which s/he is implicated. Ethnomethodology,
however, has a different and, I should argue, logically prior
conception of reflexivity.
III. The ethnomethodological notion of reflexivity dif-
fers almost totally from the above one. The only
point of coincidence is that reflexivity is seen as be-
ing, au fond, a property of the natural attitude, of
ordinary peoples commonsense descriptive activi-
ties. Certainly, in the attributing of primary import
the two approaches differ. Whilst the proponents
of stipulative reflexivity tend to pay only lip ser-
vice to reflexivity as a phenomenon in the natural
attitude, the ethnomethodology places the essen-
tial reflexivity of natural accounting practices on
centre stage, as a topic for explication in itself.
Reflexivity is not, for the ethnomethodologist, to
be arrogated and reified into the cornerstone of an
analytic method. Nor is it even conceived as the
same kind of phenomenon as that proposed by the
interpretive or critical anthropologists and their fel-
low travellers.
Reflexivity in the ethnomethodological mode is con-
ceived in terms of the inextricability of ordinary descriptions
(such as typifications of persons, actions or situations) from
the circumstances they describe: in natural descriptive ac-
counts, the descriptionand the circumstances are recipro-
cally-elaborative. It is this back-and-forth elaboration of de-
scription and circumstance that is termed (essential) reflex-
ivity. Thus reflexivity is inextricabli bound up with the
indexical properties of language, such that with reference to
descriptions:
...a description, for example, in the ways that it may be a cons-
tituent part of the circumstances it describes, in endless ways
and unavoidably elaborates those circumstances and is elabora-
ted by them. That reflexivity assures to natural language cha-
racteristic indexical properties such as following: the definite-
ness of expressing resides in their consequences...(etc.) (Gar-
finkel e Sacks, 1970, p. 338).
It is in this sense that professional analysts descriptions
partake, though derivatively, in the reflexivities of ordinary
members descriptions. Reflexivity, here is not a methodolog-
ical prescription but an essential feature of all description5.
The reflexivity is essential in that it can not be wished
away, can not be remedied or eliminated either by members
or analysts: attempts to eliminate that property not only serve
to proliferate it but also the attempts themselves will them-
selves inevitably possess it. Instead of becoming a method-
ological prescription, this analytic understanding of reflexivi-
ty remains firmly emplaced as a property of ordinary mem-
bers descriptive accounts of their situations, conduct, etc. It
has little to do with the problem of self-reflexion whether
conceived as a mundane process or as a methodological
injunction.
In his earlier work, Garfinkel (1967, Chapter 3) locates
the property of reflexivity in what he terms the documentary
method of interpretation  or, rather, in his recontextualization
of Karl Mannheims earlier formulation of the documentary
method. Garfinkel conceives of the documentary method as
an assemblçage of sense-making practices organised around
the reciprocal determination of contextual particulars and im-
puted underlying pattern. The ongoing alternation between
particular and pattern is what Garfinkel terms reflexivity.
In his latest article, Garfinkel (1996) has explicitly re-
scinded any reference to the documentary method and in-
stead has come to refer to the haecceities of a social set-
ting6. However, the term haecceities works, in effect, to
preserve what Garfinkel has always referred as the reflexive
and indexical properties of descriptive accounts. Haecceity
is a term that refers to Garfinkels proposition that any partic-
ular social setting consists in the locally-embedded methods
for its describable, identifiable production in a here and now
sense. What the term haecceity focalises is the ways in
which members bring about a given setting as a natu-
rally-accountable local object.
I hope it is clear, then, that the two types of reflexivity
differ in many basic respects: the term reflexivity is not the-
ory neutral. Stipulative reflexivity can be seen as a property of
social actors7  a mundane, self-reflective property that came
to be elevated to the level of methodological precept that ex-
panded to include the issue of self-criticism (where self
could denote, for instance, the representative of a discipline
or of a cultural tradition).
Essential reflexivity may, by contrast, be seen as a
non-extractable property of ordinary descriptions or descrip-
tive accounts considered as social actions. No elevation of
this concept to the level of a methodological precept is envis-
aged  save, of course, the recommendation that the reflexivities
of natural language use be attended to: and, quite evidently,
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since academic sociology partakes so intimately of the de-
scriptive resources of natural language, that discipline may it-
self be inspected for its discursive reflexivities.
In a still-unpublished paper by Garfinkel, there is a perspicuous
summary of the ethnomethodological view of reflexivity:
The reflexivity of descriptions is a collecting gloss for the innu-
merable ways in which descriptions can be parts of what they
describe: the reflexivity of questions is a collecting gloss for
the innumerable ways in which questions can be part of what
they question. And so on for stories, quantities, lists, instructi-
ons, maps, photographs and the rest.8
One might also characterise the distinction between
stipulative and essential reflexivity by pointing to the analytic
work done through the two concepts. Stipulative reflexivity,
when arrogated by the analyst into a methodological precept,
has as its outcome the relativisation of accounts, certainly of
analytic ones and often, selectively, of mundane accounts,
too. In this ironic mode9 it represents but the latest incarna-
tion of the ad hominem undercutting device so frequently
employed in the sociological tradition, Through which a given
descriptive account is discounted or demoted as partial,
(perspectival), flawed, misconceived, superficial, distorted,
etc. Stipulative reflexivity, then, operates in a language game
whose outcome is methodological irony, that is, the establish-
ing of a competitive relation as between ordinary and analytic
accounts with, of course, the dice being loaded in favour of
the latter.
By contrast, essential reflexivity operates as part of a
language game of methodological explication or explicitation.
It serves as part of the task of explicating the ordinary activity
of describing or accounting as these occur in context as part
of ordinary actors lived experience. In particular, the
ethnomethodologist is committed to the explication of the
practical organising logic of a given, situated descriptive ac-
count. There4 is no attempt to undercut the account by ap-
plying an external (i.e. not integrated to the situated account
itself) standard to adjudge its efficacy, validity, objectivity,
etc., unlike the case of stipulative reflexivity where an exter-
nal standard is so applied.
IV. A highly perspicuous example of essential reflexivi-
ty is that of formulations in discourse. Garfinkel
and Sacks (1970, p. 350):
A member may treat some part of the conversation as an occasi-
on to describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterise
it, or furnish the gist of it, or take note of its accordance with
rules or remark on its departure from rules. That is to say, a
member may use some part of the conversation as an occasion
to formulate the conversation.
In some work I did with John Heritage, we observed
that although all conversation may be said to have
self-descriptive, self-explicating properties, formulations are
utterance types where this property is highlighted by inter-
locutors themselves. We noted that formulations are utter-
ance types - and ipso facto conversational action types -
where, to employ Cicourels felicitous term, the conversation
descriptively folds back on itself.
In addition, formulating utterances are characteristi-
cally the first part of two-utterance units known as adjacency
pairs, (of which questions and answers are another pair
type). Through the adjacency pair format, a proposed descrip-
tion or understanding of the conversation on the part of one
speaker may be confirmed or disconfirmed on the part of
his/her interlocutor. Thus, the sense of the conversation may
be negotiated as between speakers: or, put another way,
speakers can, through using formulations, align themselves
to the sense of a conversation. In these ways, we can refer to
descriptions (or definitions), sense, understandings, etc.,
non-psychologistically as public rather than private (men-
tal) matters. This transparency is a culturally-based and (in
each and every specific circumstance) interactionally-
achieved phenomenon. Definitions, understandings, etc., are
not just social actions but are interactionally-produced,
interactionally-monitored and interactionally-ratified. In that
a formulation is a proposed gloss of the sense of a conversa-
tion or some part of it, that gloss possesses only a candidate
status as the sense, as a proper gloss, until it is confirmed
(or discomfirmed) by a co-conversationalist.
An example of a confirming of a formulation is to be
found in the following:
(SLR:11:9, DRW) Police interrogation (conducted by two
oficers) of a murder suspect who alleg-
edly killed his homosexual victim in the
victims home.
1. Suspect: Ee ad no chance ah took im bah: surprah:ze
2. Officer1: Okay
3. (ul.)) hhhmh
4. (0.9)
F 5. Officer 2: N other words whin he invited you
6. in ther his idea wz uh, foolin
7. arou:d right?
D+ 8. Suspect: Yeh his idea wz, bt not miine, ( )
9. Officer 2: En you didnt give im a chance tuh
10. right?
11. (0.3)
12. Suspect: Aftuh ee did wut ee gotta do
13. You know
14. Officer 2: Yah
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Here the formulation-confirmation pair is indicated by
letters and arrows, (F=formulation, D=decision, +=con-
firming decision). Police Officer 2s utterance (line 5) formu-
lates a circumstance of the alleged killing and this formula-
tion is confirmed or ratified by the suspect at the appropriate
point, i.e. the immediately subsequent utterance.
An instance of a disconfirmed formulation is as follows:
Excerpt from an ITV news broadcast in Great Britain,
8th December 1977, with the Yorkshire Area Miners Union
President, Mr Arthur Scargill, about proposals concerning an
agreement between the Government and national miners
union to allow local pay deals and differentials based on local
productivity.
1. Scargill: ...but you can rest assured that I
2. will not sit idly by, and nor will my
3. area council, and allow any other
4. mineworker in Britain (.) to earn more
5. money than those I represent.
6. Interviewer: Well will you
7.
8. Scargill: We will i (.) ensure
9. that those we represent (.) get the same
10. amount of payment (.) that others (.) are
11. going to be, (in) fact they are (.) anywhere
12. else in Britain
F 13. Interviewer: So i (.) pits in your area will be
14. allowed to go for productivety schemes.
D- 15. Scargill: I didnt say that at all (.) I said
16. very clearly that my members would not
17. accept a position (.) where other mineworkers
were going
18. to be paid more money for coal mining activity....
Here, on line 13 the Interviewers formulation pro-
poses a candidate gloss of Mr Scargills utterances that Mr
Scargill disconfirms, and disconfirm in an upgraded or inten-
sified manner (I didnt say that at all...), and produces a re-
formulation, with a differing sense or understanding from
that of the Interviewer, as a project basis for the continuation
of the talk. In this respect, the disconfirmation + reformula-
tion has sequential implicativeness not only at the utter-
ance-by-utterance level but at the topic level, too, (see also
the instances from Heymans study, below).
Thus we may warrant the term decision in the formu-
lation-decision pair by reference to the observation that a
confirmation or disconfirmation is made locally available here
as what Garfinkel terms a commonsense situation of choice
(where, for instance, not all of a conversation can be charac-
terised as involving decisions). In the case of an adjacency
pair, deciding is strictly an occasioned conversational activity.
We found that the proposed sense of formulations
glosses where we have got to, where we are going to, i.e.
retrospective and prospective senses of the talk. These
senses could involve the straightforward describing or per-
suasive proposing of a gist or upshot of the conversation: they
could fix interactionally the identification of a topic, or
could reformulate or change the topic.
The general ethnomethodological position is that social
order is linguistically-constituted and, consequently, that nat-
ural language can not be extracted from the natural circum-
stances it (inter alia) describes. This means that formulations
may be seen as working in what I, with some trepidation,
shall term ways that extend beyond the alignment of sense
vis-à-vis the orderliness of conversation per se.
In his study of formulations of topic in a school science
lesson (Heyman, 1986), formulations also operate to pro-
pose, monitor and ratify participants understandings of
work-thus-far, of work-to-come, of what element in the body
of scientific knowledge held by the class is now being em-
ployed, or how a given classroom event is to be taken as evi-
dencing this element, of what is to be achieved that day. In
short, formulations also reflexively gloss that which is to be
learned, attended to or practiced that day, and for which all
subsequently may be held accountable (Heyman, 1986,
p.37). In this respect, a givem classroom event and partici-
pants formulating work are inextricably interwoven and mu-
tually-elaborative. Since classroom events are, for members,
describable and discursive events, they are, through and
through, amenable to discursive practice such as formulating.
Heyman (1986, p.43) gives an example of the formula-
tion of topic in a school classroom science lesson. (T =
teacher, K = Kelly, a pupil).
18. T: ( ) water pumps over here. The air pumps
19. [10.0]
20. F T: At the end of the last class we were discussing
21. some things as to why those, most of those volumes,
22. are different...... I want to start over again and
23. go through all of these......
Here, Heyman makes clear such formulations of topics
can set up the upcoming work for the days lesson. Such for-
mulations set up the proposed activity partly under a retro-
spective rubric, i.e. as that which was done in a previous les-
son. The utterance therefore does double duty as a formu-
lation, namely formulating previous lesson material as well
as that which will immediately ensue in this lesson. The for-
mulation is a particular manifest instance of what A. V.
Cicourel termed the retrospective-prospective sense of oc-
currence: we might add that this sense pervades the con-
versational utterance types we have here called formula-
tions. We might note here, in passing, that such examples
just how important it is for the analyst to take the linguistic
turn in analysing interaction, not least in these institu-
tional contexts.
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Thus, I hope we can see that the ethnomethodological
notion of essential reflexivity bears scant relation to that of
stipulative reflexivity, i.e. of the problem of self-reflection in
either its mundane or (especially) its professional incarnations.
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